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Abstract 
We study the incentive effect of firing threats when bosses have limited information about 
workers. We show that a minimal amount of individual information about workers’ effort such 
as the time spent at their work station is sufficient to ensure strong incentive effects. This 
supports the use of firing threats based on rudimentary yet uncontroversial measures of work 
performance such as absenteeism, in organizational settings in which only limited information 
about workers is available. Our results help understand the limited link between pay and 
performance observed in compensation contracts calling for an extension of the principal-agent 
model to take into account how workers (mis-)perceive the intensity of incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
In the economic theory of incentives precise information about workers’ individual effort is 
regarded as a key input for the design of efficient compensation contracts (e.g. Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004). In the absence of such precise individual 
measures of output, firing threats have been proposed as an essential feature of the optimal 
employment contract (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 
1984; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). To assess the effectiveness of firing threats as an 
incentive mechanism one thus has to consider a setting in which such threats are likely to be 
used. Such setting is one in which supervisors possess limited information about workers’ effort 
(e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). In this paper we study behavior in such an environment. By 
assessing the effectiveness of firing threats across different levels of information, our work also 
aims at assessing the ‘robustness’ of incentive effects to a wide range of circumstances following 
the early call of Hart and Holmström (1986). 
To conduct our study, we rely on laboratory experiments so as to precisely vary the quantity 
of information across the distinct treatments. The experimental methodology allows us to assess 
the causal link between the quantity of information available to supervisors and the effectiveness 
of firing threats. To our knowledge, such a test has never been performed. Related to our work is 
the literature studying the effect of different incentive schemes on costly monetary transfers. For 
example, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) studies monitoring incentive schemes in which the 
monetary transfer of the agent is observed with a given probability. If the level of transfer is 
observed to be below a preset level, the agent is given a low pay. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) 
show that increasing the intensity of monitoring, by increasing the probability a transfer is 
observed, generates a large positive effect on transfers. In Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), there 
was no principal and the monitoring technology was exogenously defined.  
In the organizational context that we study in this paper there is a boss in charge of both 
actively monitoring and paying workers who can choose between three activities: doing a real-
effort task, spending their time chatting or browsing the web. Our setting uses a lab workplace à 
la Corgnet, Hernán-González and Schniter (2015). In order to isolate the incentive effect of firing 
threats, we consider dismissals as the only incentive mechanism available to bosses. Workers 
receive a fixed wage each period which can not be made contingent on the information available 
to the boss. 
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We conducted four treatments, three of which allow the boss to fire workers. In the firing 
treatments, the boss could fire one (out of nine) workers at the end of each of five periods 
(except for the first period). Firing treatments differed in the amount of information which could 
be collected by the boss during the monitoring of workers. 
In the complete information treatment, bosses had access to real-time information about each 
worker’s production as well as about the current activity workers were undertaking (either 
working, chatting or browsing the internet). In the partial information treatment, bosses could 
not observe workers’ production levels but could see the current activity each of them was 
undertaking. Finally, in the minimal information treatment, bosses could neither observe 
workers’ production nor could they observe their current activity. They were only informed 
about the total production of the organization. In the baseline treatment, the boss had complete 
information but could not fire anyone. 
We formulate conjectures based on a multi-period principal-agent model in which some 
agents have an intrinsic motivation for work and the principal can fire agents at the end of each 
period. In line with the informativeness principle (Holmström, 1979), our model predicts that the 
production of the organization should be highest under complete information. In addition, 
minimal information should lead to levels of effort which are not substantially higher than in the 
baseline without firing. 
We find that workers’ production and task dedication are significantly higher in all three 
firing treatments than in the baseline in which firing workers is not possible. In particular, 
organizational production is more than 50% higher in the minimal information treatment 
compared to the baseline. Organizational production in the minimal information treatment is, 
however, about 20% lower than in the other two firing treatments. Partial and complete 
information lead to the same organizational production. Our results are not consistent with the 
predictions of the principal-agent model we use, since firing threats are effective even when 
there is no individual information about workers’ actions (as is the minimal information 
treatment) and additional information is valuable, without the need for it to be complete. 
We also find no evidence for the relevance of monitoring and control costs, social incentives 
and intrinsic motivation. This brings us to the title of paper, ‘a threat is a Threat’, which is meant 
to convey that it is purely the salience of the firing threat and workers’ reaction to it which 
explains what we find. 
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Our results can help understand the lack of empirical support for the informativeness principle 
(e.g. Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000) which Holmström himself 
acknowledges (Hart and Holmström, 1986, page 51). Traditional explanations of the weak link 
between effort and pay in firms stress the negative effects of excessive monetary incentives 
which can negatively affect intrinsic motivation (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole, 2003), prevent 
workers from engaging in multitasking (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) or exploring new ideas 
(e.g. Manso, 2011).1 Our findings put forward a novel explanation for the informativeness 
principle puzzle which relies on the fact that a tighter link between effort and pay is not 
necessary for compensation schemes to provide strong incentives. Our results suggest that firing 
threats may be popular within organizations because their effects are robust to different 
informational conditions. These findings are also consistent with the theoretical literature putting 
forward scarce information as a necessary condition for firing threats to be optimal (e.g. Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984).2 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
In what follows we present a simple model that serves as a theoretical basis for our main 
conjecture. We consider a setting in which one principal pays each of the n agents a fixed wage 
() in each of  periods. The principal also has the possibility to fire a proportion f of the agents 
at the end of each period. Each worker i decides to allocate his or her time, normalized to one, to 
the following activities: productive effort ( 	 ∊ {0,1}), non-productive effort ( 	 ∊ {0,1}) or 
leisure ( ∊ {0,1}), so that  +  +  = 1.  
                                                          
1
 Explanations for the limited use of pay-for-performance contracts have built on the fact that workers may hold 
social motives such as altruism (e.g. Rotemberg, 1994, Dur and Sol, 2010) or inequity aversion (Bartling and von 
Siemens, 2010). Also, workers who are intrinsically motivated may react negatively to powerful incentives (e.g. 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) or may be motivated by alternative non-monetary compensation such as symbolic 
rewards (e.g. Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011), status (e.g. Charness et al. 2014), the mission of the firm (e.g. Besley 
and Ghatak, 2005) or non-binding goals (e.g. Wu et al. 2008; Goerg and Kube, 2012; Corgnet et al. 2016). Peer 
pressure may ensure high levels of effort without needing high-powered incentives (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 1992). 
When accurate performance measures are only available for a subset of worker’s relevant tasks, managers may 
weaken incentives to ensure that workers will not only dedicate their effort to complete the task for which 
performance measures are available (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). Weak incentives may also be optimal when 
the organization wants workers to explore new alternatives (e.g. Manso, 2011). Relational contracts may also help 
sustain optimal low-powered incentive schemes (e.g. Levin, 2003). Finally, low-powered incentives may be optimal 
to avoid disagreements between managers and workers in a context in which they have different prior beliefs 
regarding the firm’s available projects (van den Steen, 2010). 
2
 See Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2015) or Charness, Cobo-Reyes, Jimenez, Lacomba and Lagos (2017) for 
experimental literature studying dismissal barriers. 
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Agents’ productive effort determines their individual output (: = ) where  ∈
{1,… , }. The total output produced by agents is defined as  = ∑  . Non-productive effort 
simply consists in being present at the work station without working and thus entails no 
production and no effort costs. The utility function of agent i in a given period can be expressed 
as follows: 
 ≔  − !(
) + "() 
where !()
 
stands for the cost of productive effort function with !# > 0
 
and !## > 0, "() 
stands for the utility of leisure with "# > 0
 
and "## < 0. When fired, the utility of the agent 
becomes "(). We derive our main prediction using the following specification of the agents’ 
utility function:3 
 ≔  − &

'
2
− )
(1 − )
'
2
 
 We consider two types of agents which can be described as intrinsically motivated 
(&* <0) or not (&* >	0). The proportion of intrinsically-motivated agents in the population is 
commonly known to be π,.  All agents enjoy the leisure alternative in the same direction )>0.  
The principal maximizes the difference between total organizational output and the sum of 
wages paid to agents. To that end, the principal can fire a proportion f of agents at the end of 
each period We consider three cases, one in which the principal only observes total production 
() (minimal information), one in which information about workers’ leisure activities () 
(partial information) is also available and one in which the principal can observe workers’ 
individual production levels () along with total production and leisure activities (full 
information). 
In the baseline case in which the principal cannot fire (f = 0), only intrinsically-motivated 
agents will exert productive effort. Our aim is thus to study the extent to which firing threats can 
induce non-intrinsically motivated agents to exert productive effort. These conditions will 
depend on the amount of information available to the principal. In line with the informativeness 
principle, non-intrinsically motivated agents will exert productive effort for a wider range of 
parameters when more information is available to the principal (see Appendix O.2 for details). 
                                                          
3
 For ease of exposition, we express the utility of leisure (Internet browsing) as the opportunity cost of not browsing 
the Internet (1 − ). 
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The model yields conjectures which we can check in the following controlled setting that 
mimics the essential features of our model. More broadly, the informativeness principle suggests 
that every piece of information can be valuable and this suggests that the more information the 
higher the production of the organization will be. 
 
3. Design 
3.1. Lab workplace 
Our computerized experimental environment consists of a virtual organization with one boss 
(referred to as C) and nine employees (referred to as Bs).4 In our setting, employees can, at any 
point in time during the experiment, complete a real-effort task, access the Internet for leisure 
purposes or chat with other employees. Each of the three activities is undertaken in a separate 
window so that only one activity can be completed at a time allowing the experimenter a precise 
measurement of the time spent on each activity by each subject. 
The software allows for the boss to monitor employees’ activities in real time and to track 
their experimental IDs across periods. A session consisted of five production periods of 20 
minutes each. The length of the experiment was chosen so as to be able to observe fatigue and 
uncover incentive effects (e.g. Corgnet, Hernán-González and Schniter, 2015).  
3.1.1. The work task 
We use a particularly long and laborious work task to ensure that working on it required a 
significant level of effort. All subjects, the employees and the boss, had to add up numbers from 
tables with 36 numbers for one hour and 40 minutes.5 The reason for having the boss work on 
the same task as the employees is to allow him or her to assess its difficulty and, thus, to make 
firing decisions knowingly.  
In the work task, subjects were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This rule 
amplified the level of effort subjects had to exert in order to add up the matrices correctly. Each 
table had six rows and six columns. The numbers in each table were generated randomly. 
                                                          
4
 We chose to have ten people in each organization so as to represent a small company, which both in the EU and 
the US consists of at least 10 people. 
5
 Different variations of this task have been used by Bartling et al. (2009), Dohmen and Falk (2010), and Abeler et 
al. (2011). A counting task that consisted of summing up the number of zeros in a table randomly filled with ones 
and zeros was also used in Falk and Huffman (2007). A long typing task was used in Dickinson’s (1999) experiment 
for which subjects had to come during four days for a two-hour experiment. Falk and Ichino (2006) used a four-hour 
mailing task in their field experiment on peer effects. In another field experiment by Gneezy and List (2006), 
subjects were asked to enter data into a computer database for six hours. 
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Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20 cents was 
subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer.6 At the end of each period, the 
total amount of money generated by all ten subjects during the period was displayed in the 
history panel located at the bottom of their screens.  
3.1.2. Internet browsing 
The Internet browser was embedded in the software so that the experimenter could keep a 
record of the exact timing of the activities completed by each subject. Subjects were informed 
that their usage of the Internet was strictly confidential.7 
The introduction of the possibility of using the Internet is motivated by the widespread use of 
Internet at the workplace (Malachowski, 2005). An appealing feature of Internet as an alternative 
to the work task is the wide range of activities that can be undertaken online. Many people are 
likely to derive utility from Internet access as they will be able to browse web pages that best fit 
their personal interests.8  
3.1.3. Chatting activities 
The boss and all employees also had access to a chat room through which they could 
communicate with the other subjects during the experiment. A subject could send a message to 
all subjects at once or to any subset of them. If subjects received a message while not currently in 
the chat room, a pop-up window displaying the content of the message as well as the experiment 
ID of the sender would automatically appear on their screen. A subject would, however, have to 
enter the chat room to send a message. As a result, incoming chat could potentially distract 
subjects completing the work task. 
3.1.4. Monitoring activities 
In all firing treatments but the one with minimal information, the boss could monitor the nine 
employees’ activities at any time during the experiment. Monitoring activities had to be 
undertaken in a separate window so that bosses could not complete their own work task, chat or 
browse the Internet while monitoring their employees. When on the monitoring screen, bosses 
could decide whether to monitor all or a subset of the employees at the same time. Depending on 
                                                          
6
 Penalties did not apply when individual accumulated production was equal to zero so that individual production 
could not be negative. 
7
 Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet on campus. 
8
 Two related studies (Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009, Charness, Masclet and Villeval, 2014) have also 
introduced on-the-job leisure activities in experimental environments by giving subjects access to magazines. 
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the treatment, the monitor received information in real time about the activities undertaken by 
the selected subject, their current total production, as well as their contribution to the work task 
(in % terms). This virtual monitoring activity was designed to mimic current organizational 
technology (e.g. SpectorSoft 360, Virtual Monitoring™, Employee Monitoring) that allows for 
real-time monitoring of employees’ activities by tracking the time they spend on various 
applications. 
Whenever they were being watched, employees were notified with a message stating “The C 
subject is watching you” jointly with an eye picture. At the end of each period, the boss had 
access to a monitoring summary which, depending on the treatment, included information 
regarding employees’ activities during the period, their production levels as well as their 
contribution to total production. 
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click on a box moving 
slowly from left to right at the bottom of their screen. Each time subjects clicked on a box they 
earned 5 cents. The box appeared at the bottom of a subject’s screen every 25 seconds 
independently of whether the subject was currently working on the work task, chatting, or 
browsing the Internet. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 periods of 20 minutes each, 
subjects could earn a total of $12.00 just by clicking on all the 240 boxes that appeared on the 
screen during the experiment. This aimed at representing the pay that workers obtain just for 
being present at their workstation regardless of their commitment to the work task. The rationale 
for this task was to create an environment in which subjects perceive that showing up for work 
already paid off. This was introduced to help attenuate active participation, an issue which was 
raised by Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) in the context of experimental asset markets. In the 
context of our lab workplace, Corgnet, Hernán-González and Schniter (2015, page 285) stress 
that “subjects may engage actively in a focal work task because of expectations, rewards, and 
lack of desirable alternatives”. When desirable alternatives are present, active participation in 
effortful work may be traded off to some degree, revealing subtle incentive effects. 
3.2. Treatments  
Table 1 shows the main features of our treatments together with the number of subjects in 
each cell. In all treatments, employees were rewarded a fixed wage of 200¢ each period; they 
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were not incentivized based on their performance on the work task.9 The boss received the output 
produced by all subjects (including himself) on the work task, but was not paid a fixed wage. In 
all three firing treatments (complete, partial and minimal info), the boss could fire one employee 
at the end of each of periods 2, 3 and 4.10 The boss kept the fixed wage of dismissed employees 
in the following periods. Our aim was to conduct a conservative test for the effects of firing 
threats on employees’ production by considering that only one of them could be fired each 
period. Hence, up to three out of nine employees could be fired in a given experiment. 
 
Table 1. 
Summary of the treatments. 
Treatment Description 
Number of 
sessions 
(subjects) 
 
No Firing 
Complete info 
(Baseline) 
Employees were paid a fixed wage of 200¢ per period. The boss 
subject kept the value of all output produced by all employees in 
the organization. In addition, Bosses were paid the value of their 
own production. Bosses could monitor employees’ activities and 
individual production but had no possible recourse. 
6 (60) 
Firing  
Complete info 
The boss could monitor employees’ activities and individual 
production, and could fire one employee at the end of periods 2, 3 
and 4. Payment as in in the baseline but the boss also kept the 
fixed wage of dismissed employees.   
6 (60) 
Firing 
Partial info 
Same as complete info except that bosses could only monitor 
employees’ activities not accessing any information regarding 
their individual production.  
6 (60) 
Firing  
Minimal info 
Same as previous firing treatments except that bosses could not 
monitor employees and thus only had access to the total 
production of the organization when deciding upon firing 
employees. 
6 (60) 
   
                                                          
9
 The choice of 200¢ was made so that, at least some employees would not be able to produce that value thus 
inducing the boss to fire workers. This value was calibrated using previous related experiments (e.g. Corgnet, 
Hernán-González and Rassenti,  2015a). 
10
  We do not allow for firing after period 1 because of the large learning effects observed in the great majority of 
real-effort experiments that makes the first period substantially different from the rest of the experiment (e.g. e.g. see 
Charness and Campbell, 1988).  
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Dismissed employees could only browse the Internet. They were rewarded solely for 
their earnings on the clicking task which were reduced to 1¢ per box instead of 5¢ per box for the 
active employees and the boss.11 They were not able to chat with the members of the 
organization, and they could not be rehired. 
 
3.3. Survey data 
For each session, we collected survey data for a number of items (see Appendix O.1). This 
information was used to provide controls for our statistical analysis and to investigate our 
findings further.  
Adding skills. Subjects were asked to sum as many sets of five one-digit numbers as they 
could during two minutes in the spirit of Dohmen and Falk (2011). Each correct answer was 
rewarded 10 cents. The number of correct answers is what we refer to as “ability”. To ensure that 
this measure was not affected by fatigue and treatment differences, it was collected upon arrival 
at the lab and before receiving instructions for the corresponding treatment. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to fill out a 10-minute survey including 
questions regarding demographics, cognitive skills and social preferences. We collected these 
measures at the end of the experiment because they are less central to our study than adding 
skills and were not planned to be used as main controls in our analysis. 
Demographics. We asked subjects about their name, age and gender. We also asked them how 
many hours a week they usually worked for pay or volunteer. We also collected data regarding 
which degree they were currently studying. 
Cognitive skills. We measured cognitive reflection using the CRT developed by Frederick 
(2005). Our CRT measure sums the number of correct answers on the test. 
Social preferences. We elicited social preferences following Bartling et al. (2009). We asked 
subjects to make six choices between two possible allocations of money between themselves and 
another anonymous and randomly assigned subject in the experiment. In each experimental 
session, two subjects and one of the six decisions were selected at random for payment. The 
choice of the first subject in the selected decision was used to allocate payoffs between the two 
                                                          
11
 As a result, the maximum period earnings of dismissed subjects on the clicking task were equal to 48¢ instead of 
240¢ for active employees and the boss. 
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subjects. All decisions were anonymous. The allocation decisions are described in Table O1 in 
the online appendix. 
Intrinsic motivation. We measured subjects’ intrinsic motivation at the end of the 
organizational experiment by assessing whether subjects were willing to sum sets of five one-
digit numbers for two minutes in the absence of any monetary rewards (Dohmen and Falk, 
2011). This measure was purposefully collected after the treatment was completed as it was 
aimed at assessing the effect of the treatment on workers’ motivation to keep producing for no 
monetary incentives. We measure intrinsic motivation as the ratio of their performance on this 
task and their performance on the incentivized version of the same two-minute task completed 
when they entered the lab.  
3.4. Procedures 
Our subject pool consisted of students from two major Spanish Universities. The experiments 
took place between December 2014 and June 2016. In total, 240 subjects participated in the 
experiments, divided into 24 groups of 10 subjects each, that is six groups for each treatment. All 
of the interaction was anonymous. Subjects had 20 minutes to read the instructions on their 
screens. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor announced the time 
remaining and handed out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the 
subjects asked for extra time to read the instructions. The interaction between the experimenter 
and the subjects was negligible. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were computed as the sum of all 
earnings in the 5 periods plus the earnings from the adding and social preferences tasks included 
in the questionnaire. Participants playing the role of an employee (boss) in the complete, partial, 
minimal info and baseline treatments earned €29.36 (€97.47), €28.06 (€95.58), €29.21 (€76.54), 
€29.09 (€54.26) on average, respectively. This includes a five euro show-up fee. Experimental 
sessions lasted on average two hours and thirty minutes. 
4. Results 
In sections 4.1 and 4.2 we analyze the first four of the five periods of our experiment which 
correspond to the periods in which firing threats had monetary consequences. In Section 4.4.3, 
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we present the results of the last period to assess the motivational implications of firing threats. 
In Appendix A we report results when pooling data for all five periods (see Tables A.7 and A.8). 
  
4.1. Employees’ production and work dedication 
We define individual production as the monetary amount generated per answer by a given 
subject on the task divided by the reward for a correct answer (40 cents). At every step of the 
analysis, we only include subjects who belong to the organization excluding fired subjects. This 
means that in the three treatments where firing was possible, subjects who had been fired before 
an actual period were excluded from the analysis. Note, however, that none of the results are 
qualitatively affected by including the fired subjects in the analysis and considering their 
production to be zero.  
Fig.1 and Fig.2 show average production and working time for the first four periods of our 
four treatments, respectively. Working time is defined as the percentage of their time employees 
spent on the task screen instead of browsing the web or chatting with other subjects. Working 
time is thus a measure of work dedication which negatively correlates with on-the-job leisure 
which can be calculated as the time spent browsing and chatting. We analyze working time as 
well as production as these two measures can lead to different results if employees exert non-
productive effort (being present at the workstation without completing the task).  
 
Fig.1 Employees’ average production across treatments for periods 1 to 4. Subjects who have been fired before a 
current period are excluded. 
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Fig.2 Employees’ average working time (%) across treatments for Periods 1 to 4. Subjects who have been fired 
before an actual period are excluded. 
 
We use a GLS random-effects model (see Table A.1 in Appendix A)12 to check for any 
statistically significant differences in employees’ individual production across treatments. Given 
the nature of our data, we use panel regressions and robust standard errors clustered at the 
session level.13 We use random effects in all the regressions reported in this paper. Using the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, we cannot reject the random effects specification 
The results show that individual production for employees is significantly higher in treatments 
where firing is available compared with the baseline without firing threats. Average production 
in the complete info (152.8) and partial info treatments (150.4) do not differ significantly. But, 
the average production of employees is about 30% higher in the firing treatments in which the 
boss has access to individual information about employees (complete info and partial info 
treatments) compared to the minimal info treatment. These differences are statistically significant 
(see Table A.1). 
At the same time, employees spend significantly less time on the work task in the baseline 
(62.13%) than in the firing treatments (93.15%). In line with the production results, we do not 
find any significant differences in the time spent on the task between the firing treatments with 
                                                          
12
 Appendix B contains several tables with a robustness analysis of our regressions. 
13
 Following Cameron and Miller (2011), we also estimated standard errors using the wild bootstrap procedure. 
Using this procedure, we obtained very similar p-values to the ones reported in the results section. In particular, the 
effects which are shown to be statistically significant using robust standard errors continue to be significant when 
using the wild bootstrap procedure. 
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complete info (92.51%) and partial info (95.38%) (see Table A.2 in Appendix A).14 Also, 
consistently with the production findings, the time spent on the work task was increased in the 
complete info and partial info treatments compared to the minimal info treatment (91.25%). The 
differences in working time were, however, of limited magnitude and only significant when 
comparing partial info and minimal info firing treatments (see Table A.2). 
Our findings on production and work dedication contrast with our conjecture that the 
incentive effect of firing threats becomes weaker when individual information about workers is 
less precise. 
Finally, subjects could also obtain earnings from clicking on yellow boxes appearing every 25 
seconds at the bottom of their screen. No significant differences were observed across treatments 
regarding the clicking task. Subjects successfully clicked on the box in 96.46%, 93.77%, 92.59% 
and 94.25% of cases in treatments complete info, partial info, minimal info and baseline, 
respectively. 
4.2. Firing decisions 
In this section, we analyze bosses’ firing decisions in the three firing treatments. In Table 2 
we show that the fired employees in a given period in the complete and partial info treatments 
were producing less than the rest of employees in the organization. Not surprisingly, the 
difference in production between fired and non-fired subjects was more pronounced for the 
complete info than for the partial info treatment (as indicated by the higher p-values reported in 
the last row of each panel). However, as expected, we do not observe production differences in 
the minimal information treatment when comparing fired employees with the rest of employees 
in the organization as no individual information was available to bosses. 
It is worth noting that only a few employees were actually fired (less than one third of the 
number of employees that could have been fired). Across all the sessions of the three firing 
treatments, only 17 employees were fired out of 162.  This is in line with our results above that 
show that firing threats induce high effort which in turn implies that the principal does not need 
to fire workers. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 We do not present treatment comparisons for bosses in the main text because of their limited number per 
treatment. However, we show these results in Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A. 
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Table 2. 
Firing decisions per period across treatments. 
 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Total 
Complete info 
 
Total [maximum possible] number 
of fired subjects 2 [6] 2 [6] 3 [6] 7 [18] 
Average production of employees 
before being fired* 20 40 66.8 271.6 
Average production of other 
employees 197.6 204.4 169.2 715.2 
 p-value† 2.119 (0.0341) 
2.078 
(0.0377) 
1.744 
(0.0812) 
3.154 
(0.0016) 
Partial info 
 
Total [maximum possible] number 
of fired subjects 2 [6] 3 [6] 1 [6] 6 [18] 
Average production of employees 
before being fired 0 100 0 156.8 
Average production of other 
employees 148.8 177.2 154.4 694.4 
 p-value 2.12 (0.0339) 
1.17 
(0.2399) 
1.537 
(0.1244) 
2.058 
(0.0396) 
Minimal info 
 
Total [maximum possible] number 
of fired subjects 1 [6] 1 [6] 2 [6] 4 [18] 
Average production of employees 
before being fired 80 120 170 364.8 
Average production of other 
employees 114.8 160 130 520 
 
p-value 0.394 
(0.6936) 
0.659 
(0.5192) 
-0.479 
(0.6318) 
1.169 
(0.2422) 
†This p-value refers to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test that assesses whether average production is the same for 
subjects who were fired and for those who were not fired.. 
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Our results suggest that firing threats are ‘robust’ incentive schemes (Hart and Holmström, 
1986) which, regardless of the information available to the boss, effectively increase workers’ 
production compared to baseline. It seems that firing threats always appear as salient threats 
regardless of the information on which they are based.  
 
4.3. A ‘threat’ is a ‘Threat’ 
 In this section we study ‘mechanisms’ by which firing threats work by looking at whether 
they have different effects across ability levels and across periods. 
4.3.1. Firing threats across ability levels  
In the complete info treatment, the magnitude of the firing threats differs conceptually 
between low- and high- ability workers. Indeed, because a maximum of one third of the workers 
could be fired in an organization, high-ability workers could ensure their survival in the 
organization by producing slightly more than a third of the workers. We investigate this issue by 
classifying employees as either high or low ability subjects depending on whether their score on 
the adding task (used to measure their ability prior to starting the experiment) was either above 
or below the median performance of the subjects participating in the current study.15 Across all 
treatments, 51.11% of subjects are classified as high-ability subjects and 48.75% are classified as 
intrinsically motivated. We do not find significant differences in the proportion of high-ability 
subjects across treatments (p-values > 0.10 for all pairwise comparisons). 
We find that the incentive effect of firing threats holds regardless of ability levels (see Fig. 
C.1 in Appendix C). Both low- and high- ability workers produce significantly more in any of 
the firing treatments compared to the baseline. That is, high-ability employees reacted similarly 
to low-ability workers to firing threats despite that only a maximum of one third of the 
employees could ever be fired. In the complete info treatment, high-ability workers could have 
produced slightly more than low-ability workers to ensure their survival in the organization. 
However, they produced on average almost twice as much. These findings are consistent with the 
fact that firing threats are salient regardless of the magnitude of the threat. That is, ‘a threat is a 
Threat’.  
 
                                                          
15
 Our results are robust to categorizing subjects’ ability with respect to the median performance of a given 
experimental session instead of the pool of subjects recruited for the study. 
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4.3.2. Firing threats across periods  
In the complete info treatment the magnitude of the firing threats does not only differ across 
ability levels, but it also differs across periods. Being fired in the second period entails larger 
costs in terms of foregone wages than being fired at the end of the fourth period. However, as is 
shown in Table A.7, workers’ production is almost identical in periods 2 and 4 across all 
treatments. It follows that the positive effect of firing threats is as pronounced in period 2 as in 
period 4, regardless of the firing treatment. These findings are again consistent with the fact that 
firing threats are salient regardless of the magnitude of the threat. Again, ‘a threat is a Threat’.  
4.4. Other explanations 
Up to this point we have documented (1) that firing threats have an effect even with minimal 
information, (2) that some additional information about workers’ effort leads to increased 
performance and (3) that complete information does not yield higher performance that partial 
information. All this is consistent with the explanation that it is purely the salience of the firing 
threat which is at work. In this section we look at other mechanisms.  
4.4.1. Monitoring and control costs 
One possible explanation for the finding that complete information does not lead to higher 
performance than partial information is that the complete info treatment may have generated an 
excessive amount of monitoring that was detrimental to organizational production as employees 
could have perceived this intense supervision as distrust (e.g. Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). 
However, we have several pieces of evidence that do not confirm this explanation. First, the fact 
that bosses fired employees according to their relative performance levels in both the complete 
and partial info treatments (see Table 2) suggests that monitoring employees may have been as 
intensive in the partial info treatment as in the complete info treatment. Second, bosses spent 
about the same time monitoring in the complete info firing treatment (14.58%) as in the treatment 
with partial info (10.40%) (see Appendix A, Table A.9). This difference was not statistically 
significant (see Table A.10). In addition, this reasonable amount of monitoring does not seem to 
correspond to a case of high monitoring intensity as is described by Dickson and Villeval (2008) 
and which can entail distrust. Also, the negative effect of monitoring identified by Dickson and 
Villeval (2008) only appeared when workers had friendship ties, which is not the case in our 
experiments.  
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Finally, we show that the monitoring activities of the boss did not have a negative effect on 
subsequent workers’ production. In Appendix D, we present additional analysis that shows that a 
worker who was being watched by the boss in a given time span of five minutes did not 
significantly modify his or her own production in the next time span of five minutes in both the 
partial info (p-value = 0.366 for the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a worker has been 
watched in the previous 5 minutes) and complete info (p-value=0.934) treatments (see Table D.1 
in Appendix D). In sum, our findings do not seem to be consistent with an explanation based on 
excessive monitoring and control. 
4.4.2. Social incentives: Team identity and fairness concerns 
The presence of social incentives is a potential explanation for why performance is already 
high with minimal information and also for why under partial information it is as high as under 
complete information. As is illustrated in our conceptual framework (see Appendix O.2), one 
notable difference between our firing treatments is that firing decisions and thus workers’ 
compensation are expected to be a function of total production in the minimal info and partial 
info treatments whereas they only depend on individual production in the complete info 
treatment.16 It follows that one’s pay in the minimal and partial info treatments depend on others’ 
effort which is an essential aspect of social incentives settings (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 1992; 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2010). By contrast, social incentives are unlikely to be present in 
the complete info treatment as pay should only depend on one’s own performance. In the 
presence of social incentives, employees may exert high effort because they care about other 
organizational members (e.g. Rotemberg, 1994; Dur and Sol, 2010). Rotemberg (1994) stresses 
that altruism can help alleviate the free riding in teams problem whereas Dur and Sol (2010) 
stress that social incentives can be used to strengthen social interactions among workers leading 
to an improved work climate and more productive workers.  
Our data, however, are not consistent with an interpretation of our findings based on social 
incentives. First, we show that there is no interaction effect between altruism and firing 
treatments in explaining workers’ production (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). This finding thus 
contrasts with the hypothesis derived from Rotemberg (1994). Also, our analysis of chat 
activities shows that in contrast to the prediction derived from Dur and Sol (2010) the magnitude 
                                                          
16
 Because in equilibrium no firing occurs, and because our data reports only a limited number of fired employees 
we cannot reliably estimate the claim that group production influence firing decisions more significantly in the 
partial and minimal info treatments compared to complete info.   
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of chatting activities does not differ between the complete info treatment (3.6% of available time 
is spent chatting) and the social incentives treatments (minimal and partial info where 3.1% of 
available time is spent chatting) (see Appendix F, p-value = 0.729 for the coefficient associated 
to the social incentive dummy that takes value 1 for the minimal and partial info treatments).17 
This result holds whether we consider only chatting activities between peers or whether we 
include chatting activities with the boss. Also, the proportion of time employees spent 
encouraging their peers did not differ across treatments (10.45% and 7.78% of messages in 
category 4 for complete info vs partial plus minimal info, respectively; 0.52% and 2.18% of 
messages in category 5 for complete info vs partial plus minimal info, respectively; and 0.91% 
and 0.52% of messages in category 7 for complete info vs partial plus minimal info, 
respectively).    
It thus seems unlikely that either monitoring intensity or social incentives explain our 
findings. These interpretations of our results are also based on the idea that the complete info 
treatment may have underperformed because it demotivated workers because of excessive 
monitoring or a lack of social incentives. We study this possibility below by developing several 
measures of intrinsic motivation. 
4.4.3. Intrinsic motivation 
A final issue is whether our results could be explained in terms of differences in intrinsic 
motivation, of which we have two measures. First, we assess the production of workers in the 
last period of the experiment when firing threats were removed and when there were no more 
monetary incentives to produce. We find that last-period production is the highest in the 
complete info treatment in contrast with the idea that such treatment could negatively affect 
workers’ morale. Last- period production was also higher in both the partial and complete 
treatments compared to the baseline whereas there was no difference in last-period production 
between the minimal info treatment and the baseline. Similar results are found if we consider 
working dedication instead of production levels (see Figs. G.1 and G.2 in Appendix G).  
A second measure of intrinsic motivation was based on our end of experiment survey (see 
Appendix O.1). This measure was calculated as the ratio between the performance on the non-
incentivized version of the 2-minute adding task (completed at the end of the experiment) and 
                                                          
17
 Chatting data correspond to the case of workers who have not been fired and can thus chat with other 
organizational members. We also do not include the last period data in our calculation as firing threats did not apply 
then. These analyses are included in Appendix F. 
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the performance on the incentivized version of the same task (completed before the experiment 
started). We do not find significant differences across firing treatments regarding our intrinsic 
motivation measure (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-values > 0.10 for all pairwise comparisons). 
Interestingly our intrinsic motivation measure is actually slightly (although not significantly) 
higher in our firing treatments compared to the baseline suggesting that firing threats, despite 
their strong incentive effects, do not generally have a negative effect on motivation. 
5. Conclusions 
We study the robustness of the incentive effect of firing threats to different monitoring 
technologies. Our aim was to assess whether firing threats could induce high levels of 
performance when information is scarce, which is a cornerstone assumption of the models 
demonstrating the optimality of firing schemes (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).18 By studying 
the performance of firing incentive schemes under different informational conditions, our work 
also responds to the call of Hart and Holmström (1986) to study the robustness of commonly-
used incentive schemes.  
We find that the incentive effect of firing threats was robust to cases in which bosses did not 
have access to any information about workers’ individual performance. Also, the highest level of 
organizational production was obtained even when the only individual pieces information 
consisted in observing which activity employees were currently engaged in. Our findings can 
thus help account for the disconnection between pay and performance observed in compensation 
contracts (e.g. Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988). Our findings are also in line with the use of 
firing threats based on limited but uncontroversial and easily measured information about 
workers’ dedication to their job such as absenteeism (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006; Duflo, Hanna 
and Ryan, 2012).  
Our findings suggest that “a threat is a Threat” implying that workers may perceive apparently 
weak incentive schemes, based on limited information, to be strong. These potentially biased 
perceptions are not taken into account in current principal-agent models. By contrast, expectancy 
theory (Vroom, 1964) which is a major framework to study motivation in management 
disciplines stresses the essential role of the perceived link between pay and performance in 
assessing the effectiveness of incentive schemes. Because the literature on expectancy theory 
                                                          
18
 A weaker assumption would be to consider that even though precise individual information is observable by 
employers it is not verifiable (MacLeod and Malcomson 1989). 
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neither documents the nature of workers’ misperceptions nor provides a formal model, taking 
these misperceptions into account in a principal-agent framework would be an interesting avenue 
for future research.  
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Appendix A.  Additional tables and regression analyses 
Table A.1 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production (periods 1–4) across treatments. Robust 
standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant - .86 
(29.50) 
- 4.72 
(24.27) 
- 22.56 
(25.48) 
- 26.10 
(28.87) 
- 41.06 
(29.34) 
- 12.10 
(22.22) 
Treatment+ - 6.88 
(15.45) 
30.74** 
(13.22) 
76.13*** 
(13.97) 
36.37** 
(15.42) 
81.41*** 
(15.43) 
44.70*** 
(13.11) 
Ability19 8.47*** 
(1.66) 
5.45*** 
(1.29) 
5.62*** 
(1.34) 
7.43*** 
(1.69) 
7.29*** 
(1.69) 
4.49*** 
(1.23) 
Gender 19.61 
(16.20) 
27.03* 
(14.60) 
8.19 
(14.84) 
21.63 
(15.54) 
4.30 
(15.79) 
12.30 
(14.39) 
       
Number of 
observations 
419 423 426 422 425 429 
R2 0.1980 0.1591 0.2566 0.1756 0.2545 0.1424 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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 We compute ability as the number of correct answers in the mathematical task subjects do before the experiment. 
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Table A.2 
GLS regression with random effects for working time (in seconds) (periods 1–4) across treatments. Robust 
standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 1108.56*** 
(38.19) 
1123.65*** 
(39.01) 
765.94*** 
(97.51) 
1124.36*** 
(39.22) 
764.85*** 
(99.34) 
813.45*** 
(98.67) 
Treatment+ - 25.24 
(18.67) 
17.47 
(20.39) 
365.85*** 
(48.54) 
41.03* 
(23.25) 
393.61*** 
(51.31) 
349.62*** 
(49.77) 
Ability - 2.44 
(1.92) 
- 4.21* 
(2.22) 
- 1.26 
(3.85) 
- 4.42* 
(2.67) 
- 1.07 
(4.23) 
- 2.62 
(4.41) 
Gender 39.64* 
(23.88) 
20.30 
(22.61) 
- 1.44 
(49.80) 
21.36 
(29.04) 
- 2.65 
(52.99) 
- 20.79 
(51.66) 
       
Number of 
observations 
419 423 426 422 425 429 
R2 0.0416 0.0213 0.2591 0.0435 0.2998 0.2360 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 otherwise. 
Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table A.3 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production for high ability workers (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 
58.31 
(46.17) 
23.36 
(37.02) 
49.74 
(43.84) 
53.14 
(45.84) 
77.47 
(49.07) 
73.97* 
(42.57) 
Treatment+ 
10.05 
(25.09) 
49.80** 
(17.75) 
95.93*** 
(21.74) 
40.63 
(24.75) 
91.42*** 
(27.04) 
48.52** 
(21.07) 
Gender 
71.43** 
(25.42) 
68.80*** 
(19.72) 
26.33 
(23.84) 
51.22** 
(25.41) 
8.28 
(27.89) 
10.55 
(23.11) 
       
Number of 
observations 219 227 222 226 221 229 
R2 0.0687 0.1596 0.2037 0.0687 0.1359 0.0611 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table A.4 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production for low ability workers (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 128.29*** 
(30.62) 
103.79*** 
(26.21) 
51.82** 
(25.02) 
77.44*** 
(25.29) 
26.15 
(23.97) 
17.28 
(25.68) 
Treatment+ - .36 
(17.16) 
17.69 
(18.60) 
59.50*** 
(17.11) 
15.65 
(17.99) 
56.92*** 
(16.32) 
42.17*** 
(16.05) 
Gender - 12.90 
(17.17) 
- 8.51 
(18.80) 
- 1.92 
(17.07) 
10.65 
(18.08) 
17.15 
(16.12) 
23.73 
(17.50) 
       
Number of 
observations 
200 196 204 196 204 200 
R2 0.0075 0.0142 0.1518 0.0161 0.16.78 0.0953 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table A.5 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production for high ability workers (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 940.22*** 
(105.94) 
1010.40*** 
(79.51) 
715.16*** 
(120.76) 
984.05*** 
(111.19) 
702.84*** 
(137.38) 
779.86*** 
(122.39) 
Treatment+ - 10.62 
(30.31) 
27.48 
(32.13) 
393.48*** 
(70.64) 
38.98 
(39.51) 
405.91*** 
(77.42) 
372.43*** 
(73.30) 
Gender 103.12** 
(48.51) 
39.91 
(40.17) 
- 1.41 
(73.40) 
54.77 
(59.90) 
6.61 
(85.09) 
- 43.54 
(74.45) 
       
Number of 
observations 
219 227 222 226 221 229 
R2 0.0843 0.1982 0.2899 0.0207 0.3156 0.2712 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table A.6 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production for low ability workers (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 1176.25*** 
(22.85) 
1122.69*** 
(41.19) 
771.92*** 
(120.68) 
1120.89*** 
(21.47) 
771.72*** 
(119.25) 
769.37*** 
(126.98) 
Treatment+ - 44.73*** 
(15.73) 
8.94 
(25.30) 
333.36*** 
(66.70) 
53.59** 
(21.47) 
377.90*** 
(65.27) 
326.60*** 
(69.51) 
Gender - 10.95 
(15.73) 
- 10.99 
(24.96) 
6.55 
(63.71) 
- 9.68 
(20.82) 
6.69 
(62.21) 
 
       
Number of 
observations 
200 196 204 196 204 200 
R2 0.0755 0.0024 0.2277 0.0445 0.2852 0.2023 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
27 
 
Table A.7 
Average (median) [standard deviation] individual production across treatments. 
 Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal 
Periods 1-4 
Period 5 Total 
B subjects 
only 
Firing Complete 
Info (including 
fired subjects) 
3.30 
(3) 
[2.39] 
3.86 
(3.25) 
[2.69] 
3.97 
(4.25) 
[2.49] 
3.74 
(3.5) 
[2.55] 
3.72 
(3.5) 
[2.53] 
2.72 
(2) 
[2.81] 
3.51 
(3) 
[2.61] 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 4.12 
(4.5) 
[2.41] 
4.04 
(3.75) 
[2.41] 
3.82 
(3.5) 
[2.49] 
3.13 
(2) 
[2.79] 
3.70 
(3.5) 
[2.55] 
 Firing Partial Info 
(including fired 
subjects) 
3.36 
(3) 
[3.01] 
3.53 
(2.5) 
[3.10] 
4.13 
(3.5) 
[2.98] 
3.52 
(3.5) 
[2.71] 
3.63 
(3) 
[2.95] 
2.53 
(2) 
[2.61] 
3.41 
(3) 
[2.92] 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 4.29 
(3.5) 
[2.93] 
3.88 
(4) 
[2.58] 
3.76 
(3) 
[2.92] 
2.84 
(2.5) 
[2.60] 
3.59 
(3) 
[2.88] 
 Firing Minimal 
info (including 
fired subjects) 
2.37 
(1.75) 
[2.02] 
2.93 
(2.5) 
[2.56] 
3.58 
(3.25) 
[2.42] 
2.87 
(3) 
[2.40] 
2.94 
(2.5) 
[2.38] 
1.18 
(0) 
[1.93] 
2.59 
(2) 
[2.40] 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 3.65 
(3.5) 
[2.39] 
2.98 
(3) 
[2.38] 
2.98 
(2.5) 
[2.37] 
1.28 
(0) 
[1.98] 
2.66 
(2) 
[2.39] 
 Baseline 1.79 
(1) 
[2.21] 
1.81 
(1) 
[2.58] 
1.63 
(1) 
[1.92] 
1.81 
(1) 
[2.56] 
1.76 
(1) 
[2.32] 
1.39 
(0.25) 
[2.12] 
1.69 
(1) 
[2.28] 
C subjects 
only 
Firing Complete 
Info 
4.17 
(4.5) 
[2.79] 
4.92 
(3.5) 
[4.13] 
5.17 
(4.75) 
[5.32] 
4.08 
(3.5) 
[1.98] 
4.58 
(4) 
[3.55] 
4.25 
(4.25) 
[2.58] 
4.52 
(4) 
[3.34] 
 Firing Partial Info 2.58 
(2.5) 
[2.40] 
3.33 
(2) 
[2.54] 
2.67 
(2.75) 
[1.33] 
4.33 
(3.25) 
[3.14] 
3.23 
(2.5) 
[2.39] 
2.42 
(.75) 
[3.18] 
3.07 
(2.25) 
[2.52] 
 Firing Minimal 
info 
3.33 
(3.25) 
[1.33] 
3.42 
(3.5) 
[1.46] 
3.17 
(2.25) 
[2.21] 
3.08 
(3.25) 
[1.46] 
3.25 
(3.25) 
[1.55] 
3.25 
(3.75) 
[2.16] 
3.25 
(3.5) 
[1.64] 
 Baseline 1.67 
(1.5) 
[1.86] 
1.67 
(1.5) 
[1.72] 
3.17 
(2.25) 
[3.33] 
1.25 
(1.25) 
[1.04] 
1.94 
(1.5) 
[2.14] 
2.33 
(2.25) 
[1.78] 
2.02 
(1.5) 
[2.05] 
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Table A.8 
Average (median) [standard deviation] percentage of time subjects spent working across treatments. 
 Treatment Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Subtotal 
Periods 1-4 
Period 5 Total 
B subjects 
only 
Firing 
Complete Info 
(including fired 
subjects) 
92.58 
(96.62) 
[9.60] 
93.95 
(97.19) 
[7.64] 
87.66 
(95.73 
[21.77] 
85.59 
(96.17) 
[26.25] 
89.94 
(96.67) 
[18.32] 
65.79 
(85.60 
[37.64] 
85.11 
(96.05) 
[25.32] 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 91.03 
(95.96) 
[13.41] 
92.44 
(96.81 
[9.98] 
92.51 
(96.84) 
[10.32] 
75.59 
(89.26) 
[29.59] 
89.42 
(96.41) 
[16.95] 
 Firing Partial 
Info (including 
fired subjects) 
94.22 
(96.83) 
[6.94] 
94.41 
(97.99) 
[13.88] 
92.88 
(98.21) 
[18.94] 
87.66 
(97.92) 
[28.59] 
92.29 
(97.68) 
[18.89] 
68.58 
(89.82) 
[38.23] 
87.55 
(97.49) 
[25.76] 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 96.45 
(98.25) 
[4.63] 
96.61 
(98.06) 
[4.52] 
95.38 
(97.82) 
[8.52] 
77.15 
(92.35) 
[31.19] 
91.98 
(97.61) 
[16.98] 
 Firing Minimal 
info (including 
fired subjects) 
91.52 
(96.36) 
[13] 
90.83 
(97.40) 
[15.03] 
92.83 
(98.07) 
[15.17] 
84.75 
(96.17) 
[23.60] 
89.98 
(97.03) 
[17.35] 
49.29 
(47.36) 
[37.79] 
81.84 
(96.11) 
[28.07] 
 Excluding fired 
subjects 
- - 94.58 
(98.08) 
[8.11] 
88.01 
(96.63) 
[16.91] 
91.25 
(97.18) 
[13.75] 
53.23 
(49.86) 
[36.48] 
84.02 
(96.35) 
[25.01] 
 Baseline 79.78 
(88.13) 
[22.59] 
63.33 
(72.72) 
[34.11] 
55.01 
(61.93) 
[38.51] 
50.41 
(54.41) 
[35.03] 
62.13 
(72.42) 
[34.74] 
42.26 
(32.27) 
[34.88] 
58.16 
(64.32) 
[35.60] 
C subjects 
only 
Firing 
Complete Info 
79.70 
(82.44) 
[15.53] 
72.80 
(70.38) 
[18.82] 
67.87 
(61.13) 
[21.24] 
70.83 
(72.88) 
[24.69] 
72.80 
(72.88) 
[19.49] 
71.53 
(69.62) 
[20.54] 
72.55 
(72.88) 
[19.35] 
 Firing Partial 
Info 
76.04 
() 
[15.06] 
77.18 
() 
[16.22] 
78.55 
() 
[16.25] 
88.18 
() 
[6.04] 
79.99 
() 
[14.00] 
82.83 
() 
[10.74] 
80.56 
() 
[13.29] 
 Firing Minimal 
info 
96.40 
(98.04) 
[4.28] 
96.50 
(98.46) 
[3.34] 
95.83 
(97.91) 
[5.47] 
89.33 
(95.66) 
[13.09] 
94.52 
(97.99) 
[7.72] 
77.13 
(93.39) 
[38.31] 
91.04 
(97.72) 
[18.72] 
 Baseline 67.47 
(73.27) 
[25.59] 
63.84 
(73.33) 
[34.34] 
69.44 
(75.33) 
[26.40] 
69.99 
(73.26) 
[24.32] 
67.69 
(73.82) 
[26.17] 
72.02 
(80.44) 
[26.38] 
68.55 
(74.96) 
[25.81] 
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Table A.9 
Period evolution of monitoring activities (% of total time). 
Treatment Proportion of total time (in %) 
C subjects spent monitoring 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Firing Complete Info 14.58% 14.24% 15.68% 15.14% 13.25% 
Firing Partial Info 10.40% 13.71% 9.93% 13.07% 4.88% 
Baseline 12.93% 18.14% 12.47% 13.05% 8.06% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.10 
Tobit regression with random effects for monitoring time –in seconds- for periods 1 to 4. 
 
Firing Complete Info vs Partial 
Info Firing Complete Info vs Baseline 
Constant 
117.94*** 
(46.02) 
135.29*** 
(46.78) 
Treatment+ 
53.91 
(65.00) 
35.93 
(65.73) 
Number of observations n = 48 (3 left censored) n = 48 (7 left censored) 
Log likelihood (L) 
L = -284.011 
[Prob>χ2]=0.4069 
L = -270.659 
[Prob>χ2]=0.5846 
+Treatment F is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for Treatment Firing Complete Info and 0 otherwise. 
*p-Value<.10, **p-value <.05, and ***p-value <.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
 
  
 
Table A.11 
Tobit regression with random effects for working time –in seconds- per period for workers. 
 Firing Complete 
Info 
Firing Partial Info Firing Minimal info Baseline 
Constant 1110.97*** 
(25.40) 
1130.70*** 
(25.24) 
1098.22*** 
(32.60) 
957.42*** 
(56.36) 
Period 2 -16.38 
(32.21) 
1.62 
(33.82) 
-8.29 
(40.28) 
-197.46*** 
(46.28) 
Period 3 -18.03 
(32.57) 
24.02 
(34.21) 
32.73 
(40.52) 
-308.06*** 
(46.55) 
Period 4 -2.04 
(32.95) 
25.81 
(34.78) 
-45.82 
(40.75) 
-366.95*** 
(46.64) 
Period 5 -205.76*** 
(33.55) 
-207.57*** 
(34.98) 
-461.72*** 
(41.21) 
-469.43*** 
(46.79) 
     
Number of 
observations 
n = 257 (0 right 
censored) 
n = 257 (0 right 
censored) 
n = 263 (0 right 
censored) 
n = 270 (11 right 
censored) 
Log likelihood 
(L) 
L = -1701.259 
[Prob>χ2]<0.0001 
L = -1700.363 
[Prob>χ2]<0.0001 
L = -1803.411 
[Prob>χ2]<0.0001 
L = -1858.559 
[Prob>χ2]<0.0001 
*p-Value<.10, **p-value <.05, and ***p-value <.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Appendix B. Robustness analyses. 
Table B.1 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production (periods 1–4) across treatments. Robust 
standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant .63 
(.82) 
1.34** 
(.64) 
-.16 
(.63) 
-.42 
(.74) 
-.79 
(.73) 
.10 
(.57) 
Treatment+ -.24 
(.38) 
.84*** 
(.32) 
1.77*** 
(.36) 
1.04*** 
(.38) 
1.99*** 
(.37) 
1.02*** 
(.35) 
Ability .21*** 
(.04) 
.14*** 
(.03) 
.13*** 
(.03) 
.19*** 
(.04) 
.17*** 
(.04) 
.10*** 
(.03) 
CRT -.00 
(.11) 
-.00 
(.10) 
.19 
(.15) 
-.00 
(.12) 
.26 
(.18) 
.22 
(.16) 
Gender .33 
(.40) 
-.55 
(.37) 
.05 
(.38) 
-.48 
(.41) 
-.16 
(.42) 
-.10 
(.41) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
.25 
(.49) 
-.28 
(.47) 
.25 
(.47) 
.07 
(.49) 
.62 
(.49) 
.22 
(.43) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-.86** 
(.43) 
-.46 
(.42) 
-.73** 
(.36) 
-.65 
(.43) 
-.67* 
(.37) 
-.46 
(.35) 
       
Number of 
observations 
419 423 426 422 425 429 
R2 0.2170 0.1711 0.2893 0.1867 0.2925 0.1680 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.2 
GLS regression with random effects for working time (in seconds) (periods 1–4) across treatments. 
Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 1130.78*** 
(32.70) 
1147.48*** 
(36.78) 
824.70*** 
(88.85) 
1132.59*** 
(36.51) 
809.31*** 
(94.31) 
824.45*** 
(97.59) 
Treatment+ -29.01* 
(17.12) 
22.86 
(21.52) 
374.59*** 
(47.51) 
46.36** 
(22.89) 
398.54*** 
(50.55) 
341.63*** 
(51.19) 
Ability -2.75 
(1.87) 
-4.28* 
(2.19) 
-1.77 
(3.78) 
-5.23* 
(2.76) 
-1.28 
(4.13) 
-2.35 
(4.34) 
CRT 2.62 
(6.16) 
-2.97 
(7.91) 
-10.15 
(16.57) 
4.70 
(8.57) 
-4.25 
(19.40) 
-12.75 
(19.82) 
Gender 32.26 
(20.91) 
-12.04 
(21.26) 
9.43 
(50.53) 
16.63 
(27.27) 
-1.80 
(54.63) 
21.26 
(54.12) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
19.49 
(19.85) 
36.00 
(24.78) 
-40.17 
(59.30) 
59.07** 
(29.02) 
-28.19 
(58.30) 
-12.41 
(67.87) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-33.73* 
(19.84) 
-44.60 
(29.50) 
-75.60 
(53.12) 
-40.34 
(30.26) 
-66.89 
(50.30) 
-74.01 
(59.36) 
       
Number of 
observations 
419 423 426 422 425 429 
R2 0.0584 0.0361 0.2740 0.0632 0.3093 0.2453 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.3 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production (all periods) across treatments. Robust 
standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant .82 
(.76) 
1.18* 
(.61) 
-.27 
(.61) 
-.07 
(.70) 
-.63 
(.68) 
.03 
(.53) 
Treatment+ -.17 
(.36) 
1.02*** 
(.30) 
1.70*** 
(.34) 
1.14*** 
(.35) 
1.87*** 
(.34) 
.79** 
(.32) 
Ability .19*** 
(.04) 
.12*** 
(.03) 
.13*** 
(.03) 
.16*** 
(.04) 
.16*** 
(.03) 
.10*** 
(.03) 
CRT -.01 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.10) 
.18 
(.15) 
-.00 
(.11) 
.27 
(.03) 
.22 
(.16) 
Gender .25 
(.38) 
-.41 
(.34) 
.05 
(.37) 
-.29 
(.38) 
-.23 
(.18) 
-.03 
(.39) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
.225 
(.46) 
-.07 
(.45) 
.39 
(.46) 
.06 
(.44) 
.54 
(.47) 
.32 
(.42) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-.78* 
(.40) 
-.53 
(.38) 
-.62* 
(.34) 
-.62 
(.38) 
-.56 
(.34) 
-.45 
(.33) 
       
Number of 
observations 
514 520 527 520 527 533 
R2 0.1718 0.1435 0.2679 0.1490 0.2667 0.1349 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.4 
GLS regression with random effects for working time (in seconds) (all periods) across treatments. Robust 
standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 1171.74*** 
(36.22) 
1089.99*** 
(45.58) 
748.69*** 
(87.63) 
1124.60*** 
(43.20) 
788.04*** 
(94.04) 
745.33*** 
(93.64) 
Treatment+ -22.87 
(19.21) 
74.54*** 
(25.60) 
390.49*** 
(48.47) 
92.67*** 
(23.71) 
407.71*** 
(50.07) 
304.85*** 
(51.39) 
Ability -4.83** 
(2.12) 
-5.09* 
(2.76) 
-1.03 
(3.83) 
-7.41** 
(2.90) 
-2.29 
(4.10) 
-1.91 
(4.37) 
CRT -3.82 
(8.45) 
-8.05 
(9.75) 
-13.44 
(18.05) 
7.39 
(9.53) 
.87 
(20.64) 
-7.20 
(20.70) 
Gender 8.31 
(21.85) 
21.56 
(25.62) 
30.64 
(52.02) 
-12.25 
(25.76) 
-15.13 
(54.42) 
47.00 
(55.07) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
10.70 
(24.78) 
60.28* 
(30.97) 
-21.15 
(64.94) 
44.42 
(31.53) 
-49.26 
(62.22) 
2.13 
(72.47) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-25.16 
(23.85) 
-51.97 
(25.60) 
-58.81 
(55.75) 
-40.17 
(28.19) 
-59.93 
(51.37) 
-77.29 
(51.39) 
       
Number of 
observations 
514 520 527 520 527 533 
R2 0.0234 0.0418 0.2467 0.0578 0.2777 0.1619 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.5 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production for high ability workers (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 1.49 
(1.66) 
3.59*** 
(.58) 
1.68** 
(.65) 
1.69 
(1.49) 
2.30* 
(1.30) 
2.01*** 
(.65) 
Treatment+ .05 
(.61) 
1.19*** 
(.42) 
1.98*** 
(.58) 
1.20** 
(.61) 
2.09*** 
(.61) 
1.02* 
(.60) 
CRT .33 
(.21) 
.23 
(.14) 
.47** 
(.23) 
.10 
(.20) 
.40 
(.31) 
.28 
(.24) 
Gender 1.35* 
(.80) 
-1.42** 
(.56) 
-.08 
(.68) 
1.01 
(.68) 
-.45 
(.74) 
-.01 
(.63) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
.90 
(.83) 
.28 
(.63) 
.98 
(.80) 
.62 
(.90) 
1.74 
(1.20) 
.59 
(.91) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-.47 
(.86) 
-.73 
(.62) 
-.91 
(.64) 
-.86 
(.77) 
-.70 
(.73) 
-.86 
(.62) 
       
Number of 
observations 
219 227 222 226 221 229 
R2 0.1104 0.1982 0.2906 0.0893 0.2036 0.1078 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.6 
GLS regression with random effects for individual production for low ability workers (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 3.58*** 
(.81) 
2.40*** 
(.54) 
1.29** 
(.53) 
2.07*** 
(.66) 
.82 
(.57) 
1.19* 
(.65) 
Treatment+ .04 
(.44) 
.63 
(.49) 
1.39*** 
(.47) 
.51 
(.47) 
1.30*** 
(.38) 
1.08*** 
(.42) 
CRT -.04 
(.13) 
-.07 
(.13) 
.08 
(.15) 
.04 
(.14) 
.15 
(.16) 
.16 
(.19) 
Gender -.27 
(.42) 
.24 
(.49) 
.11 
(.44) 
.20 
(.48) 
.41 
(.43) 
-.36 
(.53) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
-.21 
(.50) 
-.46 
(.50) 
-.01 
(.52) 
.05 
(.39) 
.34 
(.38) 
.29 
(.42) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-.76* 
(.44) 
-.31 
(.52) 
-.46 
(.41) 
-.58 
(.49) 
-.88** 
(.38) 
-.14 
(.43) 
       
Number of 
observations 
200 196 204 196 204 200 
R2 0.0539 0.0297 0.1694 0.0347 0.2374 0.1118 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.7 
GLS regression with random effects for working time for high ability workers (in seconds) (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 982.35*** 
(115.69) 
1100.71*** 
(44.57) 
918.74*** 
(134.10) 
1025.60*** 
(101.93) 
853.99*** 
(144.46) 
928.46*** 
(107.49) 
Treatment+ -15.37 
(28.78) 
31.24 
(30.58) 
424.09*** 
(63.89) 
56.59 
(38.84) 
449.23*** 
(73.81) 
373.78*** 
(68.24) 
CRT -4.79 
(11.42) 
-17.16 
(10.80) 
-23.08 
(20.36) 
1.75 
(14.34) 
-6.60 
(27.41) 
-15.30 
(23.04) 
Gender 92.19** 
(45.71) 
-21.29 
(34.08) 
70.79 
(84.80) 
32.08 
(50.74) 
-54.72 
(88.51) 
89.35 
(73.73) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
10.99 
(27.10) 
42.89 
(40.10) 
33.01 
(71.66) 
70.58* 
(38.92) 
54.96 
(72.42) 
120.98 
(81.75) 
Behindness 
aversion 
-28.26 
(25.58) 
-91.17** 
(45.43) 
-192.33** 
(82.38) 
-76.79* 
(43.88) 
-161.06** 
(70.90) 
-203.91*** 
(77.11) 
       
Number of 
observations 
219 227 222 226 221 229 
R2 0.0922 0.0749 0.3413 0.0633 0.3515 0.3250 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Table B.8 
GLS regression with random effects for working time for low ability workers (in seconds) (periods 1–4) 
across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Partial Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal 
info vs. 
Baseline 
Constant 1163.57*** 
(20.54) 
1098.4*** 
(47.82) 
818.33*** 
(81.03) 
1110.86*** 
(38.62) 
796.63*** 
(113.12) 
784.37*** 
(137.18) 
Treatment+ -52.79*** 
(16.17) 
-10.82 
(26.18) 
320.74*** 
(68.97) 
45.76** 
(20.06) 
374.39*** 
(63.46) 
312.50*** 
(70.18) 
CRT 12.96** 
(5.34) 
14.67* 
(7.67) 
9.35 
(25.39) 
5.70 
(6.61) 
-.92 
(29.70) 
-11.47 
(36.87) 
Gender -18.03 
(15.64) 
-21.29 
(34.08) 
-19.75 
(62.99) 
-13.84 
(19.90) 
12.63 
(74.68) 
-33.29 
(85.75) 
Aheadness 
aversion 
2.90 
(17.39) 
42.89 
(40.10) 
-136.97 
(86.77) 
7.43 
(18.36) 
-130.86 
(92.05) 
-138.52 
(101.46) 
Behindness 
aversion 
2.20 
(15.90) 
-91.17** 
(45.43) 
3.46 
(75.41) 
29.75** 
(15.09) 
15.39 
(82.46) 
-22.78 
(85.81) 
       
Number of 
observations 
200 227 204 196 204 200 
R2 0.1240 0.0749 0.2560 0.0587 0.3126 0.2301 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 
otherwise. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Appendix C. Firing threats across ability level. 
 
Fig. C.1 Employees’ average total production across treatments by ability levels. 
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Appendix D. 5-minute analysis. 
Table D.1 
GLS regression with random effects for workers’ production (all periods) 
across treatments where firing is allowed. Robust standard errors. Excluding 
fired workers. 
 
Firing Complete Info Firing Partial Info 
Constant 
30.02*** 
(5.93) 
24.50*** 
(4.00) 
Minute+ 
2.77 
(2.12) 
3.68** 
(1.53) 
Watch++ 
.60 
(7.28) 
4.63 
(5.12) 
Minute_Watch+++ 
- .60 
(2.83) 
- 1.09 
(2.23) 
   
Number of observations 1028 1028 
R2 0.0032 0.0060 
+Minute takes value 1 for the first 5 minutes of a period, 2 for next 5 minutes 
and so on until value 4. 
++Watch is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a worker was observed 
in the previous 5-minute moment. 
+++Minute_Watch id the interaction term between the previous variables. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in 
parentheses) 
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Appendix E. Social incentives analysis. 
Table E.1 
GLS regression with random effects for workers’ production (periods 1–4) across treatments where 
firing was allowed. Robust standard errors clustered by session. Excluding fired workers. 
Constant 24.93 
(25.54) 
SP+ - 7.32 
(20.08) 
Altruism 6.22 
(6.70) 
SP_Altruism - 2.01 
(6.64) 
Ability 7.31*** 
(1.04) 
  
Number of observations 632 
R2 0.1488 
+SP is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the minimal and partial info treatments and 0 for the 
complete info treatment. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Appendix F. Chat analysis. 
Each chat message was assigned to one of thirty-three categories by two graduate students 
coding messages independently (see Table F.3). Then, we computed the Cohen’s Kappa 
coefficient for each category to assess inter-rater agreement (see Table F.1).20 We dropped 
category 18 and 19 from the analysis because they were empty and another five categories 
(categories 7, 20, 23, 24, and 33) because the corresponding Cohen Kappa test was not 
significant at a 5% significance level. These categories represented only 1.07% of the messages 
(see Figure F.1). The most represented category (33.82%) corresponds to distracting messages 
(e.g. jokes and stories). General and nonstrategic messages constituted the great majority 
(67.75%) of chat messages. We consider as general and nonstrategic messages the ones that were 
assigned to categories related to either presentation (category 1), distraction (categories 2 and 3) 
or general observations about the experiment (categories 27, 28, 29 and 30). Most of the strategic 
messages consisted in subjects stating their own performance (category 13, 6.24% of all 
messages) and encouraging others to produce (category 4, 4.67% of all messages). 
We present disaggregate data at treatment level of the percentage of messages of each category 
(see Table F.2). We can observe that 44.31% of messages in the baseline treatment are related to 
category 2 (jokes and stories). This percentage is relatively high compared to Firing Complete 
Info (19.61), Firing Partial Info (15.83%), and Firing Minimal Info (20.87%). In relation to 
strategic messages the highest differences we find are related to categories 4 (Encouraging others 
to produce) and 13 (State your own performance). We observe that the percentage of messages in 
these categories is much higher in the Firing Complete Info treatment (10.65% for category 4, 
and 11.95% for category 13) compare to the baseline, Firing Partial Info and Firing Minimal Info 
treatments (2.27%, 4.38% and 3.41% respectively for category 4, and 5.32%, 1.88%, and 6.41% 
respectively for category 13). 
In summary, chatting activities were mostly leisure activities. Indeed, similarly to Internet 
browsing, the average amount of time B subjects dedicated to chatting was significantly greater 
in the baseline treatment (31.54%) than in Firing Complete Info (4.71%), Firing Partial Info 
(3.89%), and Firing Minimal Info (10.08%). 
                                                          
20
 According to Landis and Koch (1977), Cohen Kappa coefficients between 0.4 and 0.6 correspond to a moderate 
agreement level and coefficients greater than 0.6 correspond to full agreement. 
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TABLE F.1 Inter-rater analysis of chat messages categorization. 
Category Agreement Expected Agreement Kappa 
Standard 
Error Z 
Prob>
Z 
1 98.97% 92.97% 0.80 0.016 51.18 0 
2 77.21% 54.82% 0.50 0.015 32.51 0 
3 87.01% 82.69% 0.25 0.015 16.38 0 
4 97.89% 91.1% 0.76 0.016 49.01 0 
5 99.54% 98.63% 0.66 0.015 43.50 0 
6 99.66% 98.60% 0.76 0.015 49.37 0 
7 99.52% 99.52% 0.001 0.0093 -0.09 0.5371 
8 97.94% 95.38% 0.55 0.015 35.74 0 
9 99.39% 99.01% 0.39 0.014 27.39 0 
10 99.66% 98.75% 0.73 0.015 47.73 0 
11 99.15% 97.25% 0.69 0.015 45.53 0 
12 99.81% 99.76% 0.20 0.016 12.78 0 
13 96.39% 88.28% 0.69 0.015 44.84 0 
14 99.85% 99.66% 0.57 0.014 40.59 0 
15 99.10% 98.91% 0.17 0.014 12.35 0 
16 99.73% 99.06% 0.72 0.016 46.04 0 
17 99.76% 99.52% 0.50 0.014 34.98 0 
18 100% 100% 0 0 0 0.5 
19 100% 100% 0 0 0 0.5 
20 100% 100% 0 0 0 0.5 
21 97.60% 94.09% 0.59 0.015 38.86 0 
22 97.87% 96.14% 0.45 0.015 30.38 0 
23 99.61% 99.61% 0.002 0.015 -0.12 0.5493 
24 99.3% 99.3% 0.002 0.017 -0.17 0.5680 
25 99.76% 99.66% 0.28 0.015 19.08 0 
26 98.59% 95.45% 0.69 0.015 45.12 0 
27 99.66% 99.61% 0.12 0.010 12.08 0 
28 97.72% 96.1% 0.42 0.015 27.40 0 
29 96.05% 91.28% 0.55 0.015 36.98 0 
30 84.22% 75.25% 0.36 0.014 26.14 0 
31 95.73% 91.68% 0.49 0.014 34.58 0 
32 98.79% 98.74% 0.04 0.010 3.98 0 
33 99.52% 99.52% 0.001 0.009 -0.09 0.5373 
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Figure F.1 Histogram of categorization of messages for all treatments. 
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Table F.2 Percentage of categories by treatment. 
Category Baseline FC FP FM 
1 3.53 2.34 4.38 3.83 
2 44.31 19.61 15.83 20.87 
3 8.47 3.64 9.79 14.26 
4 2.27 10.65 4.38 3.41 
5 0.61 0.52 1.46 0.73 
6 0.21 4.42 0.84 0.00 
7 0.07 0.91 0.21 0.31 
8 1.50 3.51 6.46 5.89 
9 0.42 1.04 0.83 0.93 
10 0.15 2.60 0.84 0.83 
11 0.92 1.04 0.21 3.72 
12 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.11 
13 5.32 11.95 1.88 6.41 
14 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.62 
15 0.57 0.13 0.83 0.73 
16 0.00 2.73 2.09 0.73 
17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 
21 3.97 2.86 1.88 1.35 
22 1.02 1.69 2.92 3.41 
23 0.02 0.00 1.46 0.83 
24 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.11 
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.45 
26 2.38 3.51 6.46 1.76 
27 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28 1.96 3.51 2.92 1.76 
29 4.28 3.51 9.79 4.44 
30 13.51 15.59 14.79 14.26 
31 3.30 3.64 7.29 6.31 
32 0.79 0.39 1.04 0.52 
33 0.11 0.00 1.46 0.42 
Total 
messages 
2398 385 240 484 
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Table F.3 Categories for chat messages. 
Group Category Category Number Category 
Social interaction 
1 Greetings (Hello/Goodbye) 
2 Distracting others (jokes, stories) 
3 Personal chat (talking about likes and dislikes) 
Positive feedback and help 
4 Encouraging others to produce 
5 Thanking other for their cooperative behavior 
6 C give positive feedback about B contributions 
7 Help others complete the task 
Discouragements 
8 Discouraging others to produce 
9 Asking others what is the point of producing 
anything 
10 C give negative feedback about B contributions 
Performance evaluation and 
comparison 
11 Ask others’ performance on the task 
12 B asks C about his/her own relative performance on 
the task 
13 
14 
State your own performance 
B talks to C about other B subjects’ performance 
Pay /firing threats 
15 B threatening C not to produce anything 
16 C threatening others to fire them if they do not 
produce enough 
17 C telling B they will be paid based on their relative 
production 
18 C telling B they will be paid based on how much 
time they spent working instead of being online 
19 C telling all Bs they will all be paid the same if they 
achieve a certain level of total production 
 
20 C telling all Bs they will all be paid the same 
regardless of performance 
Complaints about 
firing/supervision 
strategy/pay 
21 Complaints about the supervision of the C subject 
22 Complaints about the firing/pay strategy of the C 
subject 
Comments on 
firing/supervision/pay 
strategy 
23 Suggesting/stating Firing strategy 
24 Suggesting/stating Supervising strategy 
25 Comments on effectiveness of firing policy 
Envy 26 B envying the C subject 
Non-strategic 
comments on the experiment 
27 Ask others for help and hints to complete the task 
28 General comments about the experiment and its 
goals 
29 Specific comments on how earnings are calculated 
30 Other specific comments on the experiment 
Influence and manipulation 31 Influencing C subject 
Fairness 32 Negative comments on fairness of firing / pay policy 
 
33 Positive comments on fairness of firing / pay policy 
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Table F.4 
GLS regression with random effects for chat time (in seconds) (periods 1–4) across treatments where 
firing was allowed. Robust standard errors clustered by session. Excluding fired workers. 
Constant 3.59*** 
(1.27) 
SP+ - .57 
(1.64) 
  
Number of observations 632 
R2 0.0026 
+SP is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the minimal and partial info treatments and 0 for the 
complete info treatment. Excluding fired subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Appendix G. Intrinsic motivation 
 
Fig G.1 Workers’ average production in period 5 across treatments. Excluding fired workers. 
 
Fig G.2 Workers’ average working time (%) in period 5 across treatments. Excluding fired workers. 
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Table G.1 
OLS regression for workers’ production in period 5 across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired workers. 
 Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing Partial 
Info vs. 
Minimal info 
Firing Partial 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal info 
vs. Baseline 
Constant 57.65** 
(26.53) 
19.16 
(28.61) 
- 13.26 
(24.65) 
30.08 
(22.25) 
- 7.91 
(20.21) 
17.49 
(20.22) 
Treatment+ 4.87 
(21.56) 
72.64*** 
(19.40) 
65.18*** 
(19.15) 
63.99*** 
(19.10) 
61.15*** 
(18.43) 
-5. 24 
(16.06) 
Ability 4.07** 
(1.80) 
2.17 
(1.77) 
4.76** 
(1.73) 
1.43 
(1.28) 
4.39*** 
(1.44) 
2.63* 
(1.44) 
       
Number of 
observations 
95 97 101 98 102 104 
R2 0.0465 0.1443 0.1847 0.1111 0.1495 0.0324 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 otherwise. Excluding fired 
subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
 
Table G.2 
OLS regression for workers’ working time (in seconds) in period 5 across treatments. Robust standard errors. Excluding fired 
workers. 
 Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Partial Info 
Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Minimal 
info 
Firing 
Complete Info 
vs. Baseline 
Firing Partial 
Info vs. 
Minimal info 
Firing Partial 
Info vs. 
Baseline 
Firing 
Minimal info 
vs. Baseline 
Constant 97.54*** 
(7.62) 
70.97*** 
(10.15) 
44.13*** 
(9.12) 
80.70*** 
(9.32) 
50.61*** 
(9.01) 
47.05*** 
(9.74) 
Treatment+ 0.80 
(6.05) 
23.06*** 
(6.62) 
33.45*** 
(6.38) 
22.04*** 
(6.60) 
34.50*** 
(6.58) 
11.09 
(7.02) 
Ability - 1.48** 
(.52) 
- 1.20* 
(.63) 
- .13 
(.53) 
- 1.86*** 
(.59) 
- .58 
(.53) 
- .33 
(.58) 
       
Number of 
observations 
95 97 101 98 102 104 
R2 0.0734 0.1385 0.2109 0.1840 0.2265 0.0262 
+Treatment is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the first treatment in the comparison and 0 otherwise. Excluding fired 
subjects. 
*p-Value<0.1, **p-value<.0.05, and ***p-value<.0.01. (Standard deviation in parentheses) 
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Online Appendix. 
Appendix O1. Additional tables 
We detail below the tests which were completed by subjects as part of the one-hour survey 
conducted at the lab in which the experiment was performed. This survey was conducted at the 
beginning of the year, about six months before completion of Study 1. 
Summation skills 
The instructions for this task were as follows. Instructions: 
This task consists in adding five one-digit numbers. During a period of 2 minutes you can solve 
as many problems as you want to. An example of the sum problem is displayed below. Next to 
the display, there is an input box and an O.K. button. You will have to enter the result into the 
box (only integer numbers are allowed) and then click on the O.K. button. For each sum problem 
that you solve correctly, you will receive 10 cents. If you enter a wrong result and click O.K., a 
message 'Last answer was not correct.' will be displayed. You will be informed about the number 
of problems you have solved correctly (on the right hand side of the screen). The time remaining 
in seconds will be displayed in the upper left corner of the screen. 
 
Figure O1.1: Example of Adding Task question. 
Intrinsic motivation 
To measure intrinsic motivation, we assess the extent to which people performed on the previous 
adding task in the absence of any monetary incentives. We then computed the intrinsic 
motivation score as the ratio between one’s performance on the task without incentives and one’s 
performance on the task in the presence of monetary incentives. The incentive version of the task 
was presented first, and the non-incentivized version of the task was presented at the end of the 
survey. 
Social motives 
Participants made six choices between two possible allocations of money between themselves 
and another anonymous participant with whom they were randomly matched. In each 
experimental session (typically composed of 12subjects), two participants and one of the six 
decisions were selected at random for payment. The choice of the first participant in the selected 
decision was used to allocate payoffs between the two participants. All decisions were 
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anonymous. The first four decisions used the exact same payoffs as in Bartling et al. (2009). 
Decisions 5 and 6 were added by Corgnet et al. (2015). 
All the allocation decisions are described in Table C.3. Option A always yielded an even 
distribution of money ($10 to both the self and the other participant) whereas option B yielded 
uneven payoffs. For each decision, we show in parentheses the envy/compassion parameter 
associated to choosing the egalitarian and non-egalitarian options (i.e. options A and B) and in 
square brackets the proportion of subjects who chose each option. Note that the model 
parameters associated to Decisions 1-4 are the same as in Study 1, except for the fact that in 
Decision 4 the threshold for the envy parameter is now 0.125 instead of 0.5. 
 
Table O1.1. Decisions in the social preferences task (Study 1). For each option, 
we display the payoff for the decision-maker and the recipient, the associated model 
parameters (in parentheses) and the % of subjects choosing it (in square brackets). 
 
 
The altruism index is calculated as the number of times one chooses Option A for decisions 1, 2 
and 5 and Option B for decisions 3, 4 and 6. The higher the index the more likely a person values 
the other person’s payoff positively. 
 
Extended cognitive reflection test (CRT): 
Taken from Frederick (2005): 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ____ cents 
[Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents] 
Decision #
 
Option A 
self, other 
         Option B 
         self, other 
1 $10,$10 [80%] $10,$6  [20%] 
2 $10,$10 [33%] $16,$4  [67%] 
3 $10,$10 [49%] $10,$18  [51%] 
4 $10,$10 [34%] $11,$19  [66%] 
5 $10,$10 [48%] $12,$4  [52%] 
6 $10,$10 [89%] $8,$16  [11%] 
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(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes 
[Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes] 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? ____ days 
[Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days] 
Taken from Toplack et al. (2014):  
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 
12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days  
[correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9] 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many 
students are in the class? ______ students  
[correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30]  
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. 
How much has he made? _____ dollars 
[correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10]  
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after 
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for 
Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this 
point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has 
lost money 
[correct answer: c; intuitive response: b] 
 
 
Appendix O2. Model 
Firing incentive schemes 
We focus on pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria that induce the non-intrinsically motivated agents 
to exert effort. These are the equilibria that maximize the principal’s welfare as long as we 
assume that  < 1. We also assume that  > -.
/012.
'
 so that it is not only optimal for the 
principal but also efficient for non-intrinsically motivated agents to exert effort. 
i) Minimal information (). In the case in which the principal only observes total production of 
agents, he or she can only incentivize workers by threatening to fire a proportion f of workers at 
the end of a given period whenever total production falls below a certain threshold (3 ).  
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In that context, there exists a pure-strategy efficient equilibrium in which no agents are fired and 
non-intrinsically motivated agents exert effort until period 4. After that period, no agents are 
fired and only intrinsically-motivated workers exert effort. Equilibrium strategies are as follows. 
o Principals fire a proportion f of workers at the end of each of the first 4 periods if total 
production falls below 3. No agents are fired otherwise. After 4 periods nobody is 
fired.21 Non-intrinsically motivated agents will exert effort for the first 4 periods. 
o Assuming non-intrinsically motivated agents believe the firing policy of the principal 
applies, they will exert effort in the first 4 periods as long as: 5( − 4) >
-.
/012.
'
	. 
o Principals will follow their firing policy as long as it is worthwhile inducing effort from 
non-intrinsically motivated agents which is the case as long as:  < 1. Also, the principal 
does not have an incentive to unconditionally fire agents whenever  ≤ π,.22  
 
ii) Partial information (, ). In the case of partial information, the conditions to obtain the 
efficient equilibrium described in i) are more easily achieved. This is so because the principal’s 
strategy can be enhanced by threatening to fire people if  > 0. In that case, agents deviating 
will face a sure dismissal unless they decide they stay at their work station (without working, 

 = 1) instead of undertaking the leisure activity. The efficient equilibrium described in i) 
thus now holds when the following looser condition is satisfied: 5( − 4) >
-.
/0
'
. 
iii) Complete information (, , ). In that case, the efficient equilibrium can be sustained by 
firing those employees who produce nothing, regardless of total production. In that case, the 
efficient equilibrium always holds because by assumption ( − 4) >
-.
/012.
'
. 
 
 
                                                          
21
 A similar equilibrium holds when considering that a proportion of agents is always fired after period 4. 
22
 The case in which  > π, would require an additional condition to ensure that principals do not fire workers 
regardless of total production. 
